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Corporate Governance and Disclosure Practices in India: MNC Subsidiaries versus 
Domestic Cross-Listed Firms 
 
Abstract: 
 
This research intend to investigate empirically whether MNC subsidiaries have better 
corporate governance and disclosure policies compared to domestic cross-listed firms from 
the Indian perspectives. Using firms across different sectors listed in Bombay Stock 
Exchange (BSE), this research aims to analyze difference in corporate governance and 
disclosure practices  among firms owned by foreign owner (MNC subsidiaries) and local 
owner (domestic cross-listed firms). The findings can shed light on the governance and 
disclosure practices of MNC subsidiaries and domestic cross-listed firms, in different legal 
institutional environments.  
 
Several scholars have worked on the corporate governance and disclosure practices of 
domestic firms as well as MNCs subsidiaries listed in India. But comparisons between MNCs 
subsidiaries and cross-listed firms have received very little attention. The question is whether 
cross-listed firms listed abroad (US/Europe) will have different behavior in their disclosure 
policies compared to subsidiaries of MNCs. This study focuses on this direction and aims to 
analyze difference in corporate governance and disclosure practices among MNC subsidiaries 
and cross-listed firms as well as cross-listing in US versus Europe. This research indicates 
that subsidiaries of MNCs and cross-listed firms have statistical significant difference in 
corporate governance and disclosure practices. The study also found that due to different 
institutional and legal requirements, the domestic cross-listed firms disclose more 
information than MNCs subsidiaries listed only in host country. 
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Corporate Governance and Disclosure Practices in India: MNC Subsidiaries versus 
Domestic Cross-Listed Firms 
 
 
Introduction  
Firms having multinational presence such as subsidiaries of Multinational Corporations 
(MNCs) have their parent firm in other country; have operations in more than one country 
and may also be listed in the host country. MNCs subsidiaries operate across different 
countries with different corporate governance regimes, which will often deviate from 
corporate governance practices in the MNC home country. As such, host country has 
domestic firms originated and listed in the host country as well as MNC subsidiaries, 
operated and listed in the same legal institutional environment. As the regulatory 
environment in the host country is the same for both groups i.e. domestic firms and 
subsidiaries of MNCs, it is possible that domestic cross-listed firms may have different 
corporate governance and disclosure practices as they are also governed by regulatory 
environment of host country. Cross-listing involves a firm that is already trading on its home 
country stock exchange deciding to also list on an international exchange (host country). 
 
The question is whether firms with foreign ownerships (MNCs) have better behavior in their 
disclosure policies in host country compared to domestic cross-listed firms as institutional, 
legal and regulatory environment is different for both groups. Hence, this research intend to 
investigate empirically whether MNC subsidiaries have better corporate governance and 
disclosure policies compared to domestic cross-listed firms from the Indian perspectives. 
Using firms across different sectors listed in Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE), this research 
study aims to analyze difference in corporate governance and disclosure practices  among 
firms owned by foreign owner (MNC subsidiaries) and local owner (domestic cross-listed 
firms). The findings can shed light on the governance and disclosure practices of MNC 
subsidiaries and domestic cross-listed firms, in different legal institutional environments.  
 
Literature Review 
Corporate governance is defined as an institutional arrangement that not only addresses the 
agency problem between shareholders and managers of the firm, but also provides the context 
for the decisions taken by the top management of the firm (Madhani, 2015). Good corporate 
governance is a key driver of sustainable corporate growth and long-term competitive 
advantage (Madhani, 2007). Firms, across the globe, recognize that there are economic 
benefits to be gained from a well-managed disclosure policy. This shows that firms in need of 
a good deal of external financing, such as rapidly growing firms, have an incentive to 
improve their disclosure and corporate governance. In this context, the fundamental objective 
of a corporate governance framework is to identify a basis for strategic co-operation between 
shareholders and managers of the firm such that the agency problem is reduced and a basis 
for decisions that promote the competitiveness of the firm is provided (Sinha, 2006). As La 
Porta et al., (1998) argue, good corporate governance is needed for better access to external 
financing at lower cost.  
 
Prior to the adoption of Clause 49, India was considered a laggard in corporate governance 
practices. From 1947 (independence) through 1991, the Indian government pursued socialist 
policies. The government nationalized most banks, and became the principal provider of both 
debt and equity capital for private firms. The performance of the government agencies who 
provided capital to private firms was measured based on the amount of capital disbursed 
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rather than return on capital investment. This policy created little incentive for managers of 
private firms to voluntarily adopt good governance practices. Hence, during this period 
(1947-1991), corporate governance practices in India, which was considered to be 
comparable to that of British firms at independence, considerably deteriorated in spite of 
multiple legal checks through various legislation applicable to listed companies (Sapovadia, 
2011). In the year 1992, the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) - India's 
securities market regulator was formed. By the mid-1990s, the Indian economy was growing 
steadily, and Indian firms began to seek capital from variety of sources to finance expansion 
into the global market spaces created by liberalization and the growth of outsourcing (Black 
and Khanna, 2007). 
 
The need for capital by Indian firms, amongst other things, led to corporate governance 
reforms. The first major step in this area was setting up of the Confederations of Indian 
Industry (CII) Code for Desirable Corporate Governance in 1998 (Sanan, 2011). The code 
published in April 1998 comprised seventeen recommendations. A year later, in May 1999, 
SEBI announced the formation of the Kumar Mangalam Birla committee, which was tasked 
with proposing corporate governance reforms. These reforms became ‘Clause 49’ so named 
because they were implemented through a new Clause 49, which was added to stock 
exchange listing requirements. Clause 49 has both mandatory as well as voluntary provisions. 
Mandatory provisions relate to board composition, audit committees, board procedures, 
management discussion and analysis in the annual reports, certification of financial 
statements and internal controls, and corporate governance reporting. The adoption of Clause 
49 was viewed as a turning point in Indian corporate governance (Black and Khanna, 2007). 
Dharmapala and Khanna (2013) report that small Indian firms which are subject to Clause 49 
react positively to plans by SEBI to enforce the Clause 49, relative to similar firms not 
subject to Clause 49.   
 
Several studies examine Indian corporate governance generally. Khanna (2008) reviews the 
development of corporate governance norms in India beginning from independence era. 
World Bank (2005), Sarkar and Sarkar (2000), and Mohanty (2003) examine how firm-level 
governance influences the behaviour of institutional investors, or vice-versa. Mohanty (2003) 
finds that institutional investors own a higher percentage of the shares of better-governed 
Indian firms. This is consistent with research in other countries (Aggarwal et al., 2005; 
Ferreira and Matos, 2008). Bhattacharyya and Rao (2004) examine whether adoption of 
Clause 49 (an important set of governance reforms in India) predicts lower volatility and 
returns for large Indian firms. Black and Khanna (2007) conduct an event study of the 
adoption of Clause 49 and report positive returns to a treatment group of large firms (who 
were required to comply quickly) relative to small firms (for whom compliance was delayed). 
Implementation of Clause 49 in India was done staggered manner, with large firms (included 
in "Group A" on the BSE) required to comply first, followed by medium-sized firms and then 
small firms. 
 
Some research studies have shown that with increased corporate disclosure, firms experience 
a reduction in cost of equity capital (Botosan and Plumlee, 2002), as well as, the cost of debt 
(Sengupta, 1998). Similarly, Healy et al., (1999) found a beneficial increase in the firm’s 
stock liquidity and performance. Moreover, information disclosure in itself is a strategic tool, 
which enhances a company’s ability to raise capital at the lowest possible cost (Lev, 1992). 
Information disclosure plays an important role in protecting investors' rights and wealth. 
There is a long-standing assumption that stronger corporate governance is conducive to 
higher quality accounting information (Dey, 2005), and it follows that the market will react 
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favorably to better quality accounting reporting. Beekes and Brown (2006) studied Australian 
firms to investigate the association between corporate governance quality and the flow of 
information. They found that firms with better corporate governance make more informative 
disclosures.  
 
MNCs are seen as amongst the world’s most powerful types of organizations as they account 
for a large share of intellectual property rights (IPRs), are big employers and contribute to the 
economic development of the foreign countries where they operate (Williams, 2009). Firms 
having multinational presence such as subsidiaries of MNCs have their parent firm i.e. MNC 
in other country, have operations in more than one country and may also be listed in the host 
country.  
 
MNCs as a parent firm pressurize their subsidiaries internally to adopt their organizational 
practices which are transferred to it from their parent firm in home country. A MNC 
subsidiary is defined as a local affiliate of a MNC located in a foreign country of which the 
parent company holds majority ownership in promoters’ holding (Bouquet and Birkinshaw, 
2008). Externally the host country institutional environment pressurizes MNC subsidiaries to 
adopt local organizational practices. Hence, MNCs subsidiary has to decide which 
institutional pressures are more important; internal pressures that would enable it to become 
legitimate within the working environment of MNCs or the external pressures that would 
enable it to gain external legitimacy within the legal environment of the host country. In 
contrast, domestic firms need to confirm only to the demands of their domestic rules, 
regulations and stakeholder expectations (Alpay et al., 2005). 
 
MNCs subsidiaries face additional complexities and challenges in corporate governance and 
disclosure practices due to the diversity of corporate governance rules, regulations and 
stakeholder expectations in the various host countries in which they operate (Luo, 2005). 
MNCs subsidiaries operate across different countries with different corporate governance 
regimes, which will often deviate from corporate governance practices in the MNC home 
country. MNCs have to thus manage multiple economic, legal, political and cultural 
environments externally as well as complex networks of knowledge and resource flows 
internally (Volkmar, 2003). Such subsidiaries of MNCs are influenced by the parent firm in 
home country to a great extent. As such, host country has domestic firms originated and listed 
in the host country as well as MNC subsidiaries, operated and listed in the same legal 
institutional environment. As the regulatory environment in the host country is the same for 
both groups i.e. domestic firms and subsidiaries of MNCs, it is possible that subsidiaries of 
MNCs internalise some aspects of disclosure practices of their parent company and hence 
exhibit better governance and disclosure practices compared to domestic firms.  
 
Prior research applied institutional theory to the study of MNCs (Westney, 2005), especially 
to identify and study factors influencing MNC subsidiary practices in different host country 
institutional environments (Kostova and Roth, 2002; Tempel et al., 2006). Empirical research 
has found that institutional pressures created by legal environment develops an institutional 
context within which firms make decisions regarding what to disclose and how (Crawford 
and Williams, 2010). Institutional theory can also be linked to legitimacy theory, as their 
combined view could provide a better explanation of disclosure practices of MNC 
subsidiaries. The application of legitimacy theory to MNCs has been studied in detail by 
many researchers (Dacin et al., 2008; Kostova and Zaheer, 1999). They assert that a MNC 
subsidiary has to gain dual legitimacy and as such is in a state of institutional duality. Some 
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studies have examined the differences in corporate disclosure practices between MNC 
corporate headquarters and domestic firms (Krigger, 1988; Leksel and Lindgren, 1982).  
 
Global presence of MNC and its subsidiaries creates a demand for voluntary disclosure by 
such firms because MNC subsidiaries are likely to have greater information asymmetry as a 
result of their greater scope and complexity. Such effect will be larger for firms based in 
countries with weak legal environments than for firms based in countries with strong legal 
institutional environments. Hence, it is expected that the subsidiaries of MNCs will provide 
more disclosures as a result of weak legal environment at host country. Accordingly, MNC 
subsidiaries are expected to have higher corporate governance and disclosure level compared 
to domestic firms in India. Pattnaik and Gray (2012) found evidence for such hypothesis in 
Indian environment and empirically proved that subsidiaries of MNCs were more transparent 
and disclose more information than domestic listed Indian firms.  
 
Globalization could also affect level of disclosure by globally exposed firms because of firm 
complexity. That is, global firms may disclose more because they have more complex 
operations or financing arrangements that require greater disclosure. Firms may disclose 
more as globalization increases because more exposure to the capital, product, or labour 
markets increases the demand for better disclosure. Khanna, et al., (2004) analyzed the 
disclosure practices of firms as a function of their interaction with US markets for a group of 
794 firms from 24 countries in the Asia-Pacific and Europe. Researchers found positive and 
significant correlation between these disclosure scores and US listing. They found that non 
US firms interacting with the US product, capital and labour markets are more likely to use 
disclosure practices similar to those in the US as their involvement with US markets 
increases.  
 
Cross-listing is the process by which a publicly held firm lists its stocks on a stock exchange 
beyond its national boundaries and hence it refers to the situation whereby a firm lists its 
stock on an overseas exchange (Peng and Blevins, 2012; Shi et al., 2012). Cross-listing in the 
US leads to increased disclosure, this is associated with increased legitimacy from the 
perspective of analysts. The capital market is not the only market that may affect a 
multinational firm's disclosure policy. Instead, product market and labour market forces also 
can exert pressure on firms to increase disclosures even in the absence of capital market 
forces (Khanna et al., 2004). 
 
According to Karolyi (2012), over 3000 foreign firms have been cross-listed on over 40 
major stock exchanges. Major stock exchanges of the world such as New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE), NASDAQ, London Stock Exchange (LSE), and London’s Alternative 
Investment Market (AIM) have attracted significant cross-listings of firms. Also, NYSE 
Euronext (Europe), Deutsche Börse, Hong Kong, and Singapore have all become popular 
cross-listing destinations for firms. Most foreign firms cross-list in the foreign markets via 
depositary receipts. According to the Citi depositary receipts market analysis, in 2011 trading 
volumes of depositary receipts reached 170.7 billion shares compared to 148.3 billion shares 
in 2010, showing increase in volume by 22.4 billion shares. Mainly dominated by firms from 
BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China), capital raised by cross-listed firms totalled 
$16.6 billion (Peng and Su, 2014). 
 
Cross-listed firms face two conflicting pressures in global business environment. They face 
two institutional environments viz. the external environment of host country where stock is 
originally cross-listed and the internal environment of home country where stock is originally 
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listed. Cross-listed firms need to confirm to the laws, values and norms of the overseas host 
country in which they are listed as well as home country in which they operate. Hence, it is 
possible that cross-listed firms exhibit higher level of corporate governance and disclosure. 
Madhani (2014), studied Indian firms listed in Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) and found that 
cross-listed firms have better corporate governance and disclosure practices compared to 
domestic firms listed only in India. 
 
Prior research study has found substantial cross-country differences related to corporate 
governance (La Porta et al., 1999) and disclosure (Bushman et al., 2004) practices by firms. 
Listing status of firms can also be an important factor in explaining variability in the extent of 
corporate governance and disclosure. Cooke (1989a) in an analysis of Swedish firms found 
that disclosure in the corporate annual reports of domestically listed firms was significantly 
lower than that reported by multiple listed firms. According to Lang et al., (2003a), non US 
firms that are cross-listed in the US stock exchanges have earnings properties that are more 
like US firms compared to other firms in their home countries. They also found that cross-
listing of firms in the US increases the coverage by US analysts and such firms are less likely 
to manage earnings and are more likely to have earnings that are timely and conservative. 
 
There are many motives why firms may cross-list their stocks on foreign markets. Benefits of 
cross-listings can be segregated in various themes so as to give rise of many hypotheses for 
cross-listing of firms such as market segmentation, information asymmetry, recognition 
visibility, liquidity, branding, legitimacy, signaling theory and prestige hypotheses (Madhani, 
2014). The benefits of cross-listing involve both financial and informational benefits that 
result from overcoming market segmentation and reducing informational asymmetries 
(Karolyi, 1998). Empirical studies demonstrate that stronger disclosure practices of a firm are 
associated with many benefits such as decreases in its bid ask-spread (Leuz and Verrecchia, 
2000), cost of capital (Botosan, 1997) and cost of debt (Sengupta, 1998) and increases in its 
stock liquidity and analyst following (Healy et al., 1999). Lang et al., (2004) find that cross-
listed firms have more accurate analyst coverage.  
 
Firms listed overseas are exposed to greater agency problems. Consequently, voluntary 
disclosure by such firms reduces the monitoring costs of shareholders. Voluntary disclosure 
can also be associated with a capital-needs hypothesis; as such firms with objective of raising 
capital in foreign markets at the lowest possible cost of capital (Cooke, 1989b) are likely to 
increase disclosure voluntarily. Cross-listed firms from weak investor protection countries 
experience higher stock returns surrounding the listing (Foerster and Karolyi, 1999), 
relatively higher valuation (Doidge et al., 2004), more access to external finance (Lins et al., 
2005), and lower cost of capital (Hail and Leuz, 2009). Firms voluntarily choose to cross-list 
in the US market because the enhanced investor protection through cross-listings helps to 
reduce agency costs (Reese and Weisbach, 2002). Lang et al., (2003a) report an increase in 
the number of analysts and forecast accuracy indicating an increase in the level of 
information environment of foreign firms cross-listed in the US. Lang et al., (2003b) find that 
cross-listed firms have a better accounting quality in the pre cross-listed period and 
improvement in the post cross-listed period.  
 
The decision of a firm to cross-list its stock, has been found to be driven by various economic 
concerns (Nair and Skaggs, 2012). These include accessing capital from more liquid markets 
(Lins et al., 2005), widening and deepening the investor base (Jithendranathan et al., 2000), 
capitalizing on more favorable macro environments (Loughran and Ritter, 1995), reputational 
bonding (Siegel, 2005, 2009) and benefiting from a post-listing stock premium (Doidge et al., 
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2004). Cross-listing generally predicts an increase in share price. Cross-listings of firms 
lower the cost of capital as they expand a firm’s shareholder base, spreading the firm’s risk 
over a greater number of investors who, in turn, demand a smaller premium. Errunza and 
Miller (2000) document a 42% decline in the cost of capital by cross-listing.  
 
Baker et al., (2002) found that cross-listing in the US and UK increases the visibility and 
information distribution of firms as demonstrated by the increase in the number of analysts 
and media coverage and a decrease in the cost of equity capital after the cross-listing. There 
are also domestic benefits for firms that cross-list their stocks on overseas exchanges. 
Puthenpurackal (2006) found that domestic investors also bestow additional legitimacy on 
firms that cross-list, which can help them gain performance in domestic markets also. Cross-
listing of firms certainly has formal components (such as fulfilling of all formal listing 
requirements), as well as the informal components - the stronger reputation, the enhanced 
familiarity for both the cross-listed firm to know the host-country stakeholders and for the 
host-country stakeholders to know the cross-listed firm (Bell et al., 2012). 
 
Cross-listing can force firms from countries with poor investor protection to enhance the 
corporate governance by bonding a firm to increased accounting disclosure and hence 
reducing the risk of exploitation by insiders. Thus, firms from emerging markets can reduce 
their agency costs for external financing by subjecting themselves to more stringent standards 
and enforcement in developed markets (Stulz, 1999). When firms cross-list on a developed 
market, the disclosure behavior of firms attracts more scrutiny and thereby yields a 
significant increase in the quantity and quality of firms’ disclosures as they are subject to 
increased disclosure requirements (Coffee, 1999). 
 
The stricter corporate governance practices increase corporate disclosures. Jaggi and Low 
(2000) analyze the impact of legal systems on disclosures and find that higher levels of 
disclosure are exhibited by firms from common law countries than by firms from civil law 
countries. Hope (2003a) uses a larger and more representative sample of countries and finds 
that both legal origin and culture contribute to explaining corporate disclosure.  
 
There is an expanding literature that examines whether a country's legal and judicial 
institutions affect disclosures practices across countries (Jaggi and Low, 2000). Bushman et 
al., (2004) studied corporate transparency across 45 countries and found substantial 
differences in corporate disclosure practices that arose from a country’s legal as well as 
judicial regime. Researchers such as Hope (2003b), and Francis et al., (2005) also found that 
country-level institutional factors matter in explaining disclosure levels. However, for the 
most part, these studies do not consider how globally exposed firm’s disclosures are affected 
by the legal and institutional environment of the host country i.e., they ignore the fact that 
MNC subsidiaries are listed in host country as well as many firms raised funds by cross-
listing in multiple countries.  
 
Despite prior research on the corporate governance and disclosure practices of MNCs 
subsidiaries as well as cross-listed firms with reference to domestic firms, comparisons 
between MNCs subsidiaries and cross-listed firms have received very little attention. The 
question is whether cross-listed firms listed abroad (US/Europe) will have better behavior in 
their disclosure policies compared to subsidiaries of MNCs. This study focuses on this 
direction and aims to analyze difference in corporate governance and disclosure practices 
among MNC subsidiaries and cross-listed firms as well as cross-listing in US versus Europe. 
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Development of Hypotheses 
Legal institutional environment of MNC subsidiaries, operated and listed in the host country 
(i.e. in India) will be different from that of domestic firms cross-listed in developed countries 
(i.e. in US/Europe). As subsidiaries of MNCs as well as cross-listed firms are globally 
exposed in multiple institutional environments that require different disclosure rules, they 
have better disclosure. As the regulatory environment in the host country is different for both 
the groups i.e. cross-listed firms and subsidiaries of MNCs, it is possible that their corporate 
governance and disclosure practices are different although they have higher standard of 
corporate governance and disclosure compared to domestic listed firms. 
 
MNCs Subsidiaries  
Compared to domestic firms, subsidiaries of MNCs operating in developing countries are 
expected to have higher standard of corporate governance and disclose more information and 
observe better reporting practices for the various reasons explained below: 
 
1) As they have to comply with the regulations of not only their host country but also the 
parent country or home country, where accounting practices and standards of 
reporting are substantially higher.  
2) Usually, these firms are equipped with more advanced accounting software tools and 
packages, efficient audit staff, competent and efficient accounting and support staff, 
and better management practices. The variety of information collected by the parent 
firms i.e. MNCs, along with their better reporting systems can result in the increase of 
voluntary disclosures. Hence, they have the potential to disclose more information 
without any incremental processing costs on disclosures (Choi and Mueller, 1996).  
3) These firms are under closer scrutiny of various political and pressure groups within 
the host country, as they view them as sources of economic exploitation and agents of 
imperialist power (Kamran and Nicholls, 1994). Hence, such firms have an incentive 
to disclose more information in order to avert any pressure for excessive control for 
exploitation (Srinivasan, 2008). 
4) MNCs have two related levels of corporate governance structures – one at 
headquarters and other at subsidiary levels. In the case of MNCs with subsidiaries 
listed on local stock exchanges in different host countries, those subsidiaries need to 
simultaneously conform to the host country’s legal requirements as well governance 
practices of the MNC in home country (Kiel et al., 2006). Therefore, MNC 
subsidiaries face dual pressures, from the demand of the host country environment 
where they are operated and also from corporate headquarters of parent MNC in home 
country (Rosenzweig and Singh, 1991).  
 
Cross-listed Firms 
Similarly, cross-listed firms listed in US/Europe are expected to have higher standard of 
corporate governance and disclose practices compared to domestic firms for the various 
reasons explained below: 
 
1) Cross-listed firms will have a higher level of disclosure and disclose more 
information, if the requirements of overseas stock markets are greater than those of 
their domestic stock exchanges. An important driver of this increase appears to be 
compliance by cross-listed firms with stricter disclosure rules (Reese and Weisbach, 
2002). Cross-listing on the US/Europe regulated exchanges requires the firm to fully 
or partially reconcile to the US/UK, International Accounting Standards (IAS) and 
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Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and hence provide a certain level 
of mandatory disclosure that exceeds the level required by its home market. 
2) Doidge et al., (2010) found that firms in countries with weak securities law benefit 
from bonding to a country with stronger securities law. The bonding hypothesis 
suggests that domestic firms can bypass their countries’ weak legal institutions by 
listing on a foreign exchange such as major US/Europe exchange and thus become 
subject to US/Europe market’s superior corporate governance system and more 
stringent investor protection regulations. Cross-listed firms in the US/Europe have to 
abide by the more stringent rules set by capital market and stock exchange regulators 
(legal bonding). Listing in prestigious markets such as US and Europe can also be 
used by a firm to provide signals to stakeholders about a firm’s adoption of good 
governance practices. As a result, cross-listed firms should have better corporate 
governance than non-cross-listed firms from the same country.  
3) Emerging market firms would have a greater need to enhance their legitimacy through 
mechanisms such as cross-listing than their developed market counterparts, as they 
may not have the same access to institutions that their developed market counterparts 
may have (Drogendijk and Hadjikhani, 2008; Roth and Kostova, 2003).  
4) Domestic firms typically adopt the corporate governance practices of their home 
country where they are listed and operated. Cross-listed firms are expected to have 
higher standard of corporate governance and disclose more information and observe 
better reporting practices as they have to comply with the regulations of not only their 
home country but also the host country, where accounting practices and standards of 
reporting are substantially higher.  
5) Cross-listed firms are more transparent compared to firms which are listed only in the 
home market. This is because the information asymmetry arising from overseas listing 
increases the incentives for cross-listed firms listed in foreign exchanges of 
US/Europe to disclose information at a higher level. Domestic firms listed overseas 
adopt the standard disclosure rules of host country (US/Europe), which is usually 
more stringent than the disclosure practices of the home country i.e. India.  
6) Moreover, with the additional disclosure, domestic cross-listed firms improve the 
information environment in their home country also. In the scenario, where corporate 
governance codes are weak in home country, especially in terms of enforcement and 
punitive power, domestic firms do not have any incentives to disclose more. This 
suggests that the host country's legal environment have a positive impact on the 
quality of voluntary disclosures. Thus, compared to domestic firms listed only in 
home country, cross-listed firms listed overseas have stronger disclosure practices.  
 
This study focuses on corporate governance and disclosure practices of MNC subsidiaries 
and cross-listed firms from Indian stock market to study whether there are significant 
differences in their practices. 
 
Listing Requirements in US 
Foreign firms that list on US exchanges have to register with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) and become subject to US securities laws. These laws not only increase 
disclosure and financial reporting requirements, but also reduce agency costs and restrain 
controlling shareholders by imposing substantive obligations on them. US cross-listed firms 
are worth more – there is a “cross-listing premium” (Doidge et al., 2004). Oxelheim and 
Randoy (2003) suggest that foreign exchange listing signals a firm’s commitment to the 
higher disclosure standards prevailing in the market in which it lists as such firms have had to 
meet disclosure requirements of two countries - the host country and new country of listing. 
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The Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act, 2002 has made US listings significantly less attractive to 
foreign companies as SOX makes a US listing more rigorous because it imposes severe costs 
on companies and their managers, especially through the compliance requirements of Section 
404, which aims to reduce the market impact of accounting “errors” from fraud, inadvertent 
misstatements, or omissions, by assuring effective management controls over reporting and 
which, in turn, creates significant legal exposures for companies as well as for managers 
(Doidge et al., 2007).  
 
Listing Requirements in Europe 
In London, firms can list on the Main Market as a Depositary Receipt (DR) or ordinary issue 
or they can list on the Alternative Investment Market. There are different requirements for 
each listing type. Firms that list as ordinary issues must be admitted to listing by the UK 
Listing Authority (UKLA), part of the Financial Services Authority (FSA), and then be 
admitted to trading by the London Stock Exchange (LSE). Most foreign firms that list as 
ordinary issues in London seek a “secondary” listing (the “primary listing” being the home 
market – foreign firms typically do not incorporate in the UK). In general, the provisions of 
the UKLA’s listing rules that seek to protect minority investors do not apply to foreign firms 
with a secondary listing (Coffee, 2007). 
 
As the Combined Code on Corporate Governance applies only to companies incorporated in 
the UK, firms with foreign listings are not required to comply with the code. Moreover, these 
firms are not required to explain why they have chosen not to comply. The main requirement 
for firms with ordinary listings on the Main Market is to file financial information prepared in 
accordance with UK or US GAAP or International Accounting Standards (IAS), although 
exceptions are made to this requirement in some cases. Firms with foreign listings in London 
generally need only comply with the governance rules of their home country. Hence, firms 
with foreign listings in London are subject to a “light touch” approach to regulation (Doidge 
et al., 2007). 
 
Testable Hypotheses 
This research study seeks to examine how MNC subsidiaries and cross-listed firms differ in 
corporate governance and disclosure practices. As mentioned above, globally exposed firms 
such as MNC subsidiaries and cross-listed firms show higher standard of corporate 
governance and disclosure practices compared to domestic listed firms. Also, cross-listing in 
developed countries, requires better governance practices and disclosure for cross-listed 
firms. Thus, based on this argument, following alternate hypothesis is proposed: 
 
H101:  
Corporate governance and disclosure practices of domestic cross-listed firms listed in 
US/Europe are higher than those of MNC subsidiaries listed only in India. 
 
This study also explores the degree of strength for institutional environment by comparing 
institutional environment of US versus Europe. As mentioned above, US regulatory and 
institutional environment is much stronger than regulatory and institutional environment of 
Europe. Therefore, based on this argument, following alternate hypothesis is proposed: 
 
H102:  
Corporate governance and disclosure practices of domestic cross-listed firms listed in US are 
higher than those listed in Europe. 
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Research Design and Methodology 
Objectives of the Study 
1. To measure overall corporate governance and disclosure practices of MNC 
subsidiaries and cross-listed firms with the help of an appropriate instrument as an 
evaluation tool. 
2. To know that to what extent MNC subsidiaries and cross-listed firms disclosed 
through their annual reports by measuring Corporate Governance and Disclosure 
(CGD) scores of MNC subsidiaries and cross-listed firms. 
3. To understand that to what extent cross-listed firms in US and Europe are different in 
their corporate governance and disclosure practices. 
 
Scope of the Study 
This study will help us to understand that whether cross-listed firms have better corporate 
governance and disclosure practices compared to MNC subsidiaries or vice versa in Indian 
context. It also identifies whether US listed firms disclose more compared to Europe listed 
firms. 
 
Sources of Data 
For the purpose of study, data of the sample firms collected from the annual reports of the 
same for the financial year 2011-12 (for the period ending March 2012 or December 2012 
based on the firms’ financial year) have been downloaded from the CMIE PROWESS 
database (Version 4.14).  
 
Sampling Technique Applied 
Stratified sampling was used for obtaining data of firms listed in BSE and is constituent of 
S&P BSE sectoral indices. 
 
Sampling and Data Collection 
The sample for the study was collected from the firms listed in BSE in the form of S&P BSE 
sector indices. Sectoral indices at BSE aim to represent minimum of 90% of the free-float 
market capitalization for sectoral firms from the universe of S&P BSE 500 index. This sector 
index consists of the firms classified in that particular sector of the BSE 500 index.  
 
From these eleven sectors, banking sector (Bankex) was eliminated as the disclosure 
requirements for these firms are specialized and regulated by other regulatory authorities. 
Likewise, realty sector was also not considered because of specific issues of governance such 
as lack of transparency in financial transactions, valuations of land and properties. Also, 
majority of companies in these sectors are in the unorganized sectors. Hence, remaining all 
nine sectors from S&P BSE sectoral indices were studied for this research. In each of these 
sectors, top six firms as per market capitalization are selected for sample.  
 
The CGD score of firms was calculated by thoroughly scrutinizing annual report of sample of 
firms with the help of instrument developed by Subramanian and Reddy (2012). Out of 
sample of 54 firms, 12 firms are MNC subsidiaries; while remaining 42 firms are domestic 
firms. Out of these 42 firms, 26 are domestic firms listed only in India. As this study focuses 
on MNC subsidiaries and cross-listed firms, domestic firms listed only in India are excluded 
from our study; hence, making our sample size to 28. Hence, out of pool 28 firms, 12 firms 
are MNCs subsidiaries and 16 firms are cross-listed. 
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The sample firms represent different sectors viz.: Auto (11.1%), Metal (11.1%), Oil & Gas 
(11.1%), Consumer Durables (11.1%), Capital Goods (11.1%), FMCG (11.1%), Health Care 
(11.1%), IT (11.1%), and Power (11.1%). As shown below in Table 1, these 54 firms selected 
from 9 different sectors represent 91% of overall sectoral index weight. Hence, these samples 
of 54 firms truly represent selected 9 sectors. 
 
Table 1: Weight of Sample Firms in their respective Sectoral Indices 
 
Sr. 
No. S&P BSE  Sectoral Indices 
No. of 
Firms 
Studied 
Weight in 
Index 
(Per Cent) 
1 S&P BSE IT 6 95  
2 S&P BSE Healthcare 6 88  
3 S&P BSE Oil & Gas 6 94  
4 S&P BSE FMCG 6 91  
5 S&P BSE Auto 6 89  
6 S&P BSE Power  6 97  
7 S&P BSE Capital Goods 6 94  
8 S&P BSE Metal 6 82  
9 S&P BSE Consumer Durables 6 90  
Total Sample Size 54 91  
 
                                                                           (Source: Calculated form BSE Web Site) 
 
The Research Instrument: Measurement of Corporate Governance Disclosure Score  
Researchers have used various methods of computing disclosure score for determining the 
level of disclosures. The disclosure index provides a reasonable method for measuring the 
overall disclosure quality of a firm. Prior research in this area has made extensive use of such 
index methodology as a research tool (Marston and Shrives, 1991). Index method involves 
the development of an extensive list of disclosure items, which are expected to be relevant to 
the users of information.  
 
This research study use a voluntary disclosure index based on Subramanian and Reddy 
(2012) and hand-collect governance and disclosure data for final sample of 28 firms. In this 
research study, the CGD score of subsidiaries of MNCs as well as cross-listed firms listed in 
BSE were measured by doing content analysis of annual report of sample firms. One point is 
awarded when information on an item is disclosed and zero otherwise.  All items in the 
instrument were given equal weight, and the scores thus arrived at (for each category), with a 
higher score indicating greater disclosure. Final corporate governance and disclosure score 
(Maximum: 67) for each firm was calculated by adding overall score received in ownership 
(Maximum: 19) as well as and board category (Maximum: 48) (See Annexure – I). 
 
Data Analysis and Interpretation 
For the purpose of this study, the firms have been taken from nine different sectors for 
making meaningful comparison of MNCs subsidiaries and cross-listed firms. The reason 
behind this classification is to find out the extent of disclosure in MNCs subsidiaries and 
cross-listed firms. The study aims to find out if CGD scores of MNCs subsidiaries and cross-
listed firms are significantly different. In the research sample of 28 firms, 12 firms belong to 
MNCs subsidiaries while 16 firms are cross-listed (Table 2). 
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Table 2: MNCs subsidiaries and Cross-listed Firms according to Sectors 
 
 
Sr. 
No. 
 
Sector MNC Subsidiaries 
Cross-listed 
Firms Total 
1 IT 1 2 3 
2 Health Care 2 2 4 
3 Oil & Gas 1 1 2 
4 FMCG 3 2 5 
5 Auto 2 2 4 
6 Power - 2 2 
7 Capital Goods 2 2 4 
8 Metal 1 2 3 
9 Consumer Durables - 1 1 
Total 12 16 28 
(Source: Tabulated by author) 
 
Table 3, below shows sector, MNC home country and CGD score for MNC subsidiaries. 
 
Table 3: MNC Subsidiaries: Sector and Home Country Details 
 
Sr. 
No. MNC Subsidiary Sector 
MNC Parent 
Country 
(Home 
Country) 
Overseas 
Listing 
CGD 
Score 
Mean 
CGD 
Score 
1 Oracle Financial 
Services Software IT 
US 
- 20 20 
2 ABB Capital 
Goods 
Switzerland - 22 
25 3 Siemens Capital 
Goods 
Germany - 28 
4 Sterlite Industries 
(India) 
Metal UK US 30 30 
5 Maruti Suzuki Auto Japan - 19 
16 6 Cummins India Auto US - 13 
7 Cairn India Oil & Gas UK - 30 30 
8 Hindustan Unilever FMCG UK - 33 
21.33 9 Colgate-Palmolive (India) 
FMCG US - 15 
10 Nestle India FMCG Switzerland - 16 
11 GlaxoSmithKline 
Pharmaceuticals 
Health 
Care 
UK 
- 20 
21 12 Ranbaxy Health 
Care 
Japan Europe 22 
 Overall Sector CGD Score 22.33 
 
15 
 
(Source: Computed by author from company annual reports by applying Research 
Instrument) 
 
Table 4, below shows key statistics of CGD score for MNC subsidiaries. 
 
Table 4: MNC Subsidiaries: Key Sector and Statistics  
 
Sr. 
No. Sector 
No. of 
Firms 
CGD Score Mean 
CGD 
Score 
Std. 
Deviation 
CV* 
(%) Min. Max. Range 
1 IT 1 20 20 0 20 - - 
2 Capital Goods 2 22 28 6 25 4.24 16.97 
3 Metal 1 30 30 0 30 - - 
4 Auto 2 13 19 6 16 4.24 26.52 
5 Oil & Gas 1 30 30 0 30 - - 
6 FMCG 3 15 33 18 21.33 10.12 47.42 
7 Health Care 2 20 22 2 21 1.41 6.73 
Overall 12 13 33 20 22.33 6.513 29.16 
    *CV = Coefficient of Variation 
  (Source: Calculated by author) 
 
As MNC subsidiaries such as Sterlite and Ranbaxy are cross-listed (Table 4), they are 
excluded from our study. Table 5, below shows key statistics of CGD score for MNC 
subsidiaries listed only in India. 
  
Table 5: MNC Subsidiaries Listed only in India: Key Sector and Statistics  
 
Sr. 
No. Sector 
No. of 
Firms 
CGD Score Mean 
CGD 
Score 
Std. 
Deviation 
CV* 
(%) Min. Max. Range 
1 IT 1 20 20 0 20 - - 
2 Capital Goods 2 22 28 6 25 4.24 16.97 
3 Auto 2 13 19 6 16 4.24 26.52 
4 Oil & Gas 1 30 30 0 30 - - 
5 FMCG 3 15 33 18 21.33 10.12 47.42 
6 Health Care 1 20 20 0 20 - - 
Overall 10 13 33 20 22.06 6.69 30.96 
  *CV = Coefficient of Variation 
  (Source: Calculated by author) 
 
Table 6, below shows sector, overseas listing details and CGD score for cross-listed firms.  
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Table 6: Cross-Listed Firms: Sector and Listing Details  
 
Sr. 
No. 
Cross-Listed 
Firms Sector 
Overseas 
Listing 
(Host 
Country) 
CGD 
Score 
Mean 
CGD 
Score 
1 Infosys IT US 37 42 
2 Wipro IT US 47 
3 Dr. Reddy Health Care US 40 27 
4 Cipla Health Care Europe 14 
5 Reliance Industries Oil & Gas Europe 34 34 
6 ITC FMCG Europe 41 32.5 
7 United Spirits FMCG Europe 24 
8 Mahindra & 
Mahindra 
Auto Europe 30 32 
9 Tata Motors Auto US & 
Europe 
34 
10 Reliance 
Infrastructure 
Power Europe 30 29.5 
11 Tata Power Power Europe 29 
12 L & T Capital Goods Europe 31 27 
13 Crompton Greaves Capital Goods Europe 23 
14 Hindalco Metal Europe 20 26 
15 Tata Steel Metal Europe 32 
16 Videocon Consumer 
Durables 
Europe 18 18 
Overall Sector CGD Score 30.25 
 
(Source: Table developed by author) 
 
Table 7, below shows key sector statistics of CGD score for cross-listed firms. 
  
Table 7: Cross-Listed Firms: Key Sector and Statistics  
 
Sr. 
No. Sector 
No. of 
Firms 
CGD Score Mean 
CGD 
Score 
Std. 
Deviation 
CV* 
(%) Min. Max. Range 
1 IT 2 37 47 10 42 7.07 16.84 
2 Health Care 2 14 40 26 27 18.38 68.09 
3 Oil & Gas 1 34 34 0 34 - - 
4 FMCG 2 24 41 17 32.50 8.56 26.33 
5 Auto 2 30 34 4 32 2.83 8.84 
6 Power 2 29 30 1 29.5 0.71 2.40 
7 Capital Goods 2 23 31 8 27 5.66 20.95 
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8 Metal 2 20 32 12 26 8.49 32.64 
9 Consumer 
Durables 
1 18 18 0 18 - - 
Overall 16 14 47 33 30.25 8.87 29.33 
*CV = Coefficient of Variation 
  (Source: Table developed by author) 
 
Research Procedures for Testing Hypotheses 
This research conducted an inferential statistical analysis for testing the hypotheses. In order 
to test the significant differences in the CGD scores of domestic firms and cross-listed firms, 
parametric t-test was used. 
 
Summary of Findings and Empirical Results 
Table 8, below shows key statistics of CGD score for MNCs subsidiaries and cross-listed 
firms. 
 
Table 8: MNCs Subsidiaries and Cross-listed Firms: Key Statistics 
 
Sr. 
No. Type of Firms 
No. of 
Firms 
CGD Score Mean 
CGD 
Score 
Std. 
Deviation 
CV* 
(%) Min. Max. Range 
1 MNCs 
Subsidiaries 
10 13 33 20 21.60 6.69 30.96 
2 Cross-listed 
Firms 
16 14 47 33 30.25 8.87 29.33 
3 Total 26 13 47 34 26.92 9.04 33.58 
*CV = Coefficient of Variation 
(Source: Table developed by author) 
 
Values of minimum, maximum, mean and standard deviation of CGD score for MNCs 
subsidiaries and cross-listed firms have also been reflected. Results show that there is a 
difference between mean and standard deviation of CGD score for MNCs subsidiaries and 
cross-listed firms. Analysis of the result shown in Table 8 indicates that mean of CGD score 
is higher for cross-listed firms at 30.25. Also, the standard deviation of CGD score is higher 
at 8.87 for cross-listed firms when compared to MNCs subsidiaries in the sample.  
 
H01: There are no differences in corporate governance and disclosure practices of MNC 
subsidiaries listed only in India and domestic cross-listed firms. 
 
The hypotheses have been tested using the univariate t-test. Group statistics and independent 
sample test output is given in Table 9 and Table 10 respectively. 
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Table 9: Group Statistics for MNCs subsidiaries and Cross-listed Firms 
 
Group Statistics 
Type of Firm No. of Firms Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
Mean 
  CGD 
  Score  
MNC 
Subsidiaries 10 21.6000 6.68664 2.11450 
Cross-listed 
Firms 16 30.2500 8.87318 2.21830 
Source: Computed by author with SPSS 20 
                                                            
Table 10: Independent Samples Test 
 
CGD 
Score 
Levene's 
Test for 
Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std.  
Error 
Differen
ce 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.529 .474 -2.642 24 .014 -8.65000 3.27428 -15.40779 -1.89221 
Equal 
variances  
not 
assumed 
  
-2.823 22.998 .010 -8.65000 3.06463 -14.98970 -2.31030 
Source: Computed by author with SPSS 20 
                                                                                                             
Table 11, shows result of univariate test. 
 
Table 11: Results of Univariate Test 
 
Null Hypothesis t -Value 
Significance 
Level 
No significant difference in CGD scores of  
MNCs subsidiaries and cross-listed firms 
-2.642 .014 
Source: Computed by author with SPSS 20 
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Mean score of MNCs subsidiaries listed in India and domestic firms cross-listed in 
US/Europe are different with MNCs subsidiaries having CGD scores of 21.60 while cross-
listed firms having scores of 30.25. Results of parametric test, as indicated in Table 11, show 
that significance value p is less than 0.05, therefore at 5% level of significance; null 
hypothesis of equality of means is rejected. Thus, there exists statistically significant 
difference between corporate governance and disclosure practices of MNCs subsidiaries and 
cross-listed firms and as such corporate governance and disclosure practices of cross-listed 
firms are higher than MNCs subsidiaries. The difference is significant as firms in both 
categories have different regulatory environment based on their place of listing and as such 
cross-listing requirements of domestic firms in US/Europe are much stringent compared to 
listing requirements in India. 
 
H02: There are no differences in corporate governance and disclosure practices of domestic 
firms cross-listed in US and Europe. 
 
This hypothesis studies whether corporate governance and disclosure practices between 
domestic firms listed in US and Europe are different. As Tata Motors is cross-listed in both 
US as well as Europe, it is excluded from testing of this hypothesis. Hence, there are 15 firms 
in this category from overall sample with 3 firms listed in US while remaining 12 firms are 
listed in Europe. Group statistics and independent sample test output is given in Table 12 and 
Table 13 respectively.  
 
Table 12: Group Statistics for Domestic Firms Listed in US and in Europe 
 
Group Statistics 
 
Cross-Listed 
Firms 
 
No. of 
Firms Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
CGD 
Score 
US 3 41.3330 5.13160 2.96273 
Europe 12 27.1667 7.57788 2.18755 
 
                              (Source: SPSS 20 output) 
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Table 13: Independent Samples Test 
 
CGD 
Score 
Levene's 
Test for 
Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. 
Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.919 .355 3.025 13 .010 14.16667 4.68335  4.04891  24.28443 
Equal 
variances  
not 
assumed 
  
3.847 4.530 .015 14.16667 3.68282  4.39669  23.93664 
 
(Source: SPSS 20 output) 
Table 14, shows result of univariate test. 
 
 Table 14: Results of Univariate Test 
 
Null Hypothesis t-Value 
Significance 
Level 
No significant difference in CGD scores of  
Indian firms cross-listed in US and Europe. 3.02 .010 
 
                                                                                     (Source: SPSS 20 output) 
 
Mean score of domestic firms listed in US and firms listed in Europe are different with firms 
listed in US having CGD scores of 41.33 while firms listed in Europe having scores of 27.16.  
Results, as indicated in Table 14, show that significance value p is less than 0.05, therefore at 
5% level of significance; null hypothesis of equality of means is rejected. Thus, there exists 
statistically significant difference between corporate governance and disclosure practices 
among domestic firms listed in US and Europe as such practices of domestic firms cross-
listed in US is higher than firms listed in Europe. The difference is significant as firms in both 
categories have different regulatory environment based on their place of listing and as such 
US listing requirements are much stringent compared to listing requirement of firms in 
Europe. 
 
Discussion and Research Implications 
Prior research findings suggest that MNCs subsidiaries and cross-listed firms have higher 
corporate governance and disclosure level, compared to domestic firms. This research study 
seeks to identify whether corporate governance and disclosure practices of MNCs 
subsidiaries and cross-listed firms are significantly different, by studying sample of firms 
from Indian stock market, comprising MNCs subsidiaries listed in India as well as cross-
listed firms listed in US/Europe. The research also looks into institutional, legal and 
regulatory environment of US and Europe from the perspectives of corporate governance and 
disclosure practices, to study whether they are significantly different for firms listed in those 
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countries. The research findings can shed light on the governance and disclosure practices of 
MNC subsidiaries and cross-listed firms, in legal institutional environment of India versus 
US/Europe.  
 
This research offers a new angle to explore how firms interact with different institutional 
environments and found that there is a significant relationship between corporate governance 
and disclosure practices of firms and the legal environment of country. Although, subsidiaries 
of MNCs disclose more compared to domestic firms, their practices are not compatible with 
those of their parent MNCs usually located in developed countries with a strong legal 
environment. As such not so strong institutional environment of host country may influence 
corporate governance and disclosure practices of MNCs subsidiaries. Hence, this research 
found that corporate governance and disclosure practices of MNCs subsidiaries are weaker 
than such practices of cross-listed firms. Similarly, this research found that corporate 
governance and disclosure practices of domestic firms listed in US are better than such 
practices of firms listed in Europe. It is because, institutional and legal environments of US 
and Europe is different with US is having higher standard of corporate governance and 
disclosure compared to Europe. Hence, this research supports bonding hypothesis as a driver 
for higher corporate governance and disclosure practices of cross-listed firms. 
 
This study contributes to several areas of research: 
1. This research contributes to an emerging line of research that examines the 
governance and disclosure practices of firms exposed to global markets.  
2. The main contribution of this study is that it examines whether the interaction 
between globalization and legal institutional environment affects governance and 
disclosures by MNCs subsidiaries and cross-listed firms. 
3. This research adds to the emerging literature that uses country-level institutional 
features, such as legal origin to explain cross-country differences in governance and 
disclosure practices.  
4. This research examines how disclosure practices of MNC subsidiaries’ and cross-
listed firms are affected by the legal environment of host country where it’s listed 
when compared to domestic firms. 
5. This research contributes to the growing literature on MNCs subsidiaries, cross-listing 
of firms as well as India specific research. 
 
In conclusion, this research found that institutional and legal environment of US and Europe 
is quite stronger compared to institutional and legal environment of India. Also, institutional 
and legal environment of Europe is weaker compared to such environment of US. 
 
Limitations of Study 
This research focuses on institutional environment of India, where MNC subsidiaries and 
domestic firms are listed and institutional environment of US/Europe where domestic firms 
are cross-listed. To get bigger picture, future research may focus on multiple institutional 
environment of various countries. Although sample size for this research is not too big, it 
fairly represents sectoral indices of BSE. Lastly as this study analyses data of sample firms 
for the financial year 2011-12 only, future study may be conducted with more current or 
multiple year panel data. 
 
Conclusions 
This research indicates that subsidiaries of MNCs and cross-listed firms have statistical 
significant difference in corporate governance and disclosure practices. The study also found 
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that domestic cross-listed firms disclose more information than MNCs subsidiaries listed only 
in host country. It is because of quite different institutional and legal environment for MNC 
subsidiaries listed in India, compared to listing environment of US/Europe where domestic 
firms are cross-listed. This research concludes that country has a major role in shaping 
corporate governance and disclosure practices of MNC subsidiaries as well as cross-listed 
firms. Hence, cross-listed firms have better corporate governance and disclosure practices 
compared to MNC subsidiaries listed only in India. Also, institutional, legal and regulatory 
environment of US is much stronger compared to Europe and hence US cross-listed firms 
display higher standard of corporate governance and disclosure practices compared to 
Europe. The research provides insight regarding the question of how a country’s institutional, 
legal and regulatory environment may influence the effectiveness of firm-level corporate 
governance mechanisms. This study may be of interest to regulators, policy makers and 
practitioners that are considering the implementation of additional mandatory requirements to 
improve investor protections or corporate governance. 
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ANNEXURE – I 
 
Instrument for Measuring CGD Score of Sample Firms 
 
Component 
1: 
Board and Management Structure and Process 
Sr. 
No. Disclosure of: 
 1 
2 
3 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
 
21 
22 
23 
24 
 
25 
Details about current employment/position of directors provided? 
Details about previous employment/positions provided? 
When each of the directors joined the board? 
Details about whether the chairman is executive or non-
executive? 
Detail about the chairman (other than name and executive 
status)? 
Details about the role of the board of directors in the company? 
Are the dates of board meetings disclosed? 
Is the aggregate board attendance disclosed for each meeting? 
Are directors attending over 60 per cent of the board meetings? 
Are attendance details of individual directors at board  
meetings disclosed? 
Do independent directors constitute at least 1/3 of the board? 
Do independent directors constitute more than 1/2 of the board? 
Do independent directors constitute more than 2/3 of the board? 
A list of matters reserved for the board? 
Is the list of audit committee (AC) members disclosed? 
Is the majority of AC independent? 
Is the chairman of the AC independent? 
Is disclosure made of the basis of selection of AC members? 
Is the aggregate attendance of AC meetings disclosed? 
Is the attendance of individual directors at AC meeting 
disclosed? 
Does the company have a remuneration committee? 
Is the list of remuneration committee members? 
Is the majority of RC independent? 
Is the remuneration committee chaired by an independent 
director? 
Is the frequency of RC meetings disclosed? 
Component 
2: Board and Management Structure and Process 
 Sr. 
No. Disclosure of: 
 26 
27 
 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
Is the aggregate RC meeting attendance disclosed? 
Is disclosure made of individual members’ attendance in RC  
meetings? 
Does the company have a nominating committee? 
Is the list of members of the nominating committee disclosed? 
Is the majority of nominating committee independent? 
Is the frequency of NC meetings disclosed? 
The existence of a strategy/investment/finance committee? 
The number of shares in the company held by directors? 
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34 
 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
 
42 
43 
44 
 
45 
46 
47 
48 
 
A review of the last board meeting disclosed (for example,  
 minutes)? 
Whether they provide director training? 
The decision-making process of directors’ pay? 
The specifics on performance-related pay for directors? 
Is individual performance of board members evaluated? 
Is appraisal of board performance conducted? 
The decision making of managers’ (not Board) pay? 
The specifics of managers’ (not on Board) pay (for example,  
salary levels and so on)? 
The forms of managers’ (not on Board) pay? 
The specifics on performance-related pay for managers? 
The list of the senior managers (not on the Board of Directors)? 
The backgrounds of senior managers disclosed? 
The details of the CEO’s contract disclosed? 
The number of shares held by the senior managers disclosed? 
The number of shares held in other affiliated companies by 
managers? 
Component 
3: 
Ownership Structure and Investor Relations 
 Sr. 
No. Does the annual report contain? 
 1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
 
8 
 
9 
 
10 
11 
 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
 
17 
18 
19 
Top 1 shareholder? 
Top 3 shareholders? 
Top 5 shareholders? 
Top 10 shareholders? 
Description of share classes provided? 
Review of shareholders by type? 
Number and identity of shareholders holding more than 3 per 
cent? 
Number and identity of shareholders holding more than 5 per 
cent? 
Number and identity of shareholders holding more than 10 per  
cent? 
Percentage of cross-ownership? 
Existence of a Corporate Governance Charter or Code of Best 
Practice? 
Corporate Governance Charter/Code of Best Practice itself? 
Details about its Articles of Association (for example, changes)? 
Voting rights for each voting or non-voting share? 
Way the shareholders nominate directors to board? 
Way shareholders convene an Extraordinary General Meeting 
(EGM)? 
Procedure for putting enquiry rights to the board? 
Procedure for putting proposals at shareholders meetings? 
Review of last shareholders meeting (for example, minutes)? 
 
(Source: Subramaniana and Reddy, 2012) 
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